NEWS
Cursor’s Marketplace Served a Backdoored Claude Code Update
A tampered Claude Code listing sat in Cursor’s store for about 11 hours, reaching at most 5,000 users, while the built-in install cooldown stayed at zero.
A tampered Claude Code extension sat in Cursor’s own marketplace for about 11 hours on October 29, 2026, and reached at most 5,000 users. It shipped under the real ID Anthropic.claude-code as versions 2.1.312 and 2.1.313 for Windows and macOS. Anthropic did not build those copies.
The listing ran as soon as the editor loaded the file. On most Macs and PCs the last hop into SSH failed. The store still proved it can put a backdoor on machines that hold source code, Git identities, and cloud-key names.
Eleven Hours Under the Real Extension ID
Cursor, the SpaceX-owned AI editor, said a modified Claude Code package was available in the Cursor VS Code Extension Marketplace from about 2:27 a.m. PT to 1:35 p.m. PT on October 29. The company said those versions were not developed by Anthropic, and that other listings on cursor.com/marketplace, plus Grok Bot, Grok, and other SpaceXSI products, were not touched.
On October 30 Cursor posted that the incident impacted at most 5,000 users, took the marketplace down, then brought it back after an access audit. It asked every customer to move to Claude Code for VS Code 2.1.314.
We identified a security incident affecting a modified Claude Code VS Code extension accessed through our Cursor IDE extension marketplace, impacting at most 5,000 users. This malicious version of the extension was not developed by Anthropic. It does not impact other extensions…
— Cursor (@cursor_ai) October 30, 2026
THE OCTOBER 29 WINDOW
- October 29, 2026, about 2:27 a.m. PT: Tampered Anthropic.claude-code 2.1.312 and 2.1.313 become available in Cursor’s marketplace for Windows and macOS.
- October 29, 2026, about 1:35 p.m. PT: The live window ends. Cursor removes the builds and later shuts the whole marketplace while it audits other listings.
- October 29, 2026: Cursor publishes a security notice and remediation scripts, rotates marketplace keys, rebuilds the store, and works with the host of 134.209.82.225 to take the attacker server offline.
- October 30, 2026: Cursor says at most 5,000 users were affected and tells customers to install 2.1.314. At 11:30 a.m. PT it updates hashes and names both 2.1.312 and 2.1.313.
- October 30-31, 2026: Phorion publishes its advisory (first at 05:30 UTC on October 30, then corrects the marketplace at 09:13 UTC, then adds 2.1.312 at 00:43 UTC on October 31). Microsoft Threat Intelligence posts its own teardown on October 30.
The packages Cursor hashed were darwin-arm64 and win32-x64 builds. The JavaScript inside them still carried Linux startup logic, but Cursor’s notice scoped the served files to Windows and macOS.
The Loader Ran Before Anyone Opened a Chat
Phorion, which first saw the implant on a customer Mac, found an injected function spliced onto the front of extension.js. The rest of the bundle still looked like Claude Code, with the usual activate and deactivate exports. Node ran the prefix as soon as it loaded the file, before the real extension started.
The user doesn’t need to interact with the extension for the payload to fire.
Phorion, Official Claude Code Extension Compromise advisory
Microsoft Threat Intelligence’s analysis of the injected loader matches that chain. The code collected hostname, username, OS, architecture, home path, working directories, and the global Git email. It kept up to 40 environment-variable names matching KEY, TOKEN, SECRET, PASS, AWS, or GCP. It sent names, not values, so the operator got a map of which laptops looked worth a later login.
Then it appended an Ed25519 public key labelled svc-telemetry to ~/.ssh/authorized_keys, tried to turn on the local SSH service, and opened a reverse tunnel to 134.209.82.225 as user tunnel on port 22, forwarding a server-chosen port back to localhost:22. A second embedded key, commented svc-telemetry-tun, authenticated that outbound hop. Background loops retried the tunnel about every 60 seconds. A delayed HTTP POST to port 8099 carried the host report. Microsoft noted the loader swallowed errors so the real Claude Code UI kept working.
Most Macs Never Got a Working Tunnel
Cursor said that outside unusual cases where the editor was started with admin rights, errors in the malicious code stopped the SSH-enable step, so the attacker could not have logged in through the tunnel on most macOS and Windows hosts. The key, the startup files, and the host report still went out. Follow the cleanup anyway, the company said.
Phorion documented the failed macOS Remote Login check in detail. The script ran systemsetup -getremotelogin with no sudo, then only tried to turn Remote Login on if the output matched Off. As a standard user, systemsetup prints “You need administrator access to run this tool… exiting!” and still exits 0. The Off test fails, so the enable command never runs. Phorion’s reading is that “I cannot check” is treated as “SSH is already on.” If Remote Login was already enabled, or is turned on later, the planted key is waiting.
The Windows path has its own miss. Phorion found the service-setup command passed through a helper that hardcodes /bin/sh, which does not exist on a normal Windows install. None of the enable steps included a privilege-escalation exploit. Calum Hall, cofounder and CEO of Phorion, called the outcome fortunate.
Everyone was so lucky here, this was potentially a really dangerous foothold for an attacker.
Calum Hall, cofounder and CEO, Phorion
Cursor’s Marketplace Cooldown Defaults to Zero
Cursor’s own help pages already describe a control built for this shape of attack. Team admins can set a marketplace install cooldown so a new version cannot install until it has sat in the store for a chosen number of hours. The docs say that buffer is meant to blunt short-lived malicious uploads. The default is 0 hours, which means it is off. An 11-hour listing would have missed a cooldown set even to 12.
MARKETPLACE CONTROLS ALREADY ON THE BOOKS
- Proxy scanning: Search and downloads go through marketplace.cursorapi.com, which Cursor says runs automated malware and supply-chain analysis with commercial tools before a listing is shown or served.
- Install cooldown: Team owners can force a fleet-wide delay; the shipped default is 0, and a user setting exists when a team has not locked it.
- Allowlists: Teams can restrict installs to named publishers or extension IDs through the dashboard or MDM.
- Signature checks: Enterprises can require valid Open VSX signatures at install time.
- Verified badges: Cursor says a badge confirms publisher identity and is only one layer of trust.
A tampered build under Anthropic.claude-code would have cleared a badge that only checks who the publisher claims to be. The docs also warn that the same publisher.extension name can point to different code on Open VSX than on Microsoft’s marketplace, and tell users to treat extension IDs like dependencies. October 29 was that warning with a live payload.
Uninstalling Does Not Remove the Implant
Cursor said uninstalling the extension may not be enough, because the payload drops standalone scripts that keep running outside the extension folder. Phorion’s cleanup list starts by killing ssh or autossh to 134.209.82.225, then pulling startup objects, then deleting the svc-telemetry line from authorized_keys. Rotate credentials from a clean machine if the host looks touched. The limited env-var collection, Cursor noted, does not rule out later credential use over the backdoor.
FILES THAT SURVIVE AN UNINSTALL
| Platform | Startup object | Files to remove |
|---|---|---|
| macOS | User LaunchAgent labelled com.apple.sysmond, RunAtLoad and KeepAlive on | ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.apple.sysmond.plist, ~/.config/.smt, ~/.config/.smtk, $TMPDIR/.stk_* |
| Windows | Scheduled task SysMon (asks for SYSTEM); fallback sysmon.cmd in Startup | %USERPROFILE%\.config\smt.cmd, smtk, %TEMP%\.stk_*, Startup\sysmon.cmd |
| Linux (in the payload) | User crontab @reboot entry for ~/.config/.smt | ~/.config/.smt, ~/.config/.smtk, /tmp/.stk_* |
The planted login key fingerprint is SHA256:0Z6R+DF64Do2nwQic8a7kkfDLNNk4IiK+2U2Rci4htk. The outbound tunnel key fingerprint is SHA256:KOAU57+ZG6u3MG4WwzPzPX2O5YEe9qdOC1Bl+6MVyDQ. Phorion says hunts should use the fingerprint, not only the svc-telemetry comment, because the script itself only checks for that comment before appending. Inbound sessions that did succeed would show in SSH logs as localhost logins with that key.
Official Claude Code Channels Stayed Clean
Microsoft confirmed the malicious packages were never published from the Visual Studio Marketplace or from npm’s @anthropic-ai/claude-code. Anthropic told Microsoft its systems were not compromised and that it did not develop the package posted in Cursor’s store. All evidence Microsoft cited stayed inside that one marketplace.
WHERE THE BUILDS DID AND DID NOT SHIP
| Channel | 2.1.312 | 2.1.313 |
|---|---|---|
| Cursor VS Code Extension Marketplace | Tampered Windows and macOS builds on October 29 | Tampered Windows and macOS builds on October 29 |
| Microsoft Visual Studio Marketplace | Not distributed, per Microsoft | Never published, per Microsoft |
| npm @anthropic-ai/claude-code | Not affected | Not affected |
Felix Rieseberg, a member of Anthropic’s technical staff, put the split in public on October 30. David Dworken, who works on security at Anthropic, said the incident did not involve a compromise of any Anthropic systems and that Anthropic was not involved with building, publishing, or hosting the tampered extension.
We’re working with Cursor on this incident, but it wasn’t a compromise of Anthropic’s systems or employee laptops. A malicious actor used access to Cursor’s marketplace to publish a tampered copy of the Claude Code extension, which we didn’t build or publish. The versions on our… https://t.co/pCBJLqwGUj
— Felix Rieseberg (@felixrieseberg) October 30, 2026
Cursor Has Not Said How the Upload Happened
Cursor said it audited access, confirmed no other extensions were tampered with, rotated keys, and rebuilt the marketplace. Felix Rieseberg wrote that a malicious actor used access to Cursor’s marketplace to publish a tampered copy. That is the most specific public account of the path in. Cursor did not add a forensic narrative about stolen tokens, a bad publisher session, or an internal tool.
Replies under Cursor’s own notice went straight at that gap: a modified build under the official Anthropic name is the part the post leaves out. Identity review on a real ID would not have caught wrong bytes. Scanning that is supposed to run before a listing is served did not keep a prepended loader out for about 11 hours. The leftover risk is not a second Anthropic breach. It is whatever still lets a store that auto-serves editor code publish in a trusted publisher’s name.
WHAT WE KNOW
- The channel: Only Cursor’s marketplace served the tampered 2.1.312 and 2.1.313 Windows and macOS builds, per Cursor and Microsoft.
- The vendor: Anthropic says its systems and staff laptops were not compromised, and Microsoft says it received that confirmation.
- The leftover: Uninstalling the extension does not remove the SSH key or startup scripts.
WHAT IS UNCONFIRMED
- Publish access: Neither Cursor nor Anthropic has said how the actor obtained the right to publish under Anthropic.claude-code.
- Operator logins: Public write-ups reconstruct what the code tried to do; they do not tally how many hosts accepted an inbound shell.
Frequently Asked Questions
Which Claude Code versions in Cursor were backdoored?
Cursor named Anthropic.claude-code 2.1.312 and 2.1.313 for Windows and macOS, in darwin-arm64 and win32-x64 packages, and asked everyone to install 2.1.314. The 2.1.313 label never appeared as a legitimate Anthropic drop on the channels Microsoft checked; Anthropic’s clean jump was 2.1.314.
Does updating to 2.1.314 remove the SSH backdoor?
No. The implant writes authorized_keys and startup files outside the extension directory, so a newer listing leaves them in place. Cursor’s macOS script is meant to run as the affected user, not as root; the Windows script is meant to run from an Administrator PowerShell. Both exit non-zero if remnants remain.
How can I tell if my Mac installed the fake Claude Code update?
Cursor’s quick test is grep -qs svc-telemetry ~/.ssh/authorized_keys. A safer check is ssh-keygen -lf ~/.ssh/authorized_keys and a look for fingerprint SHA256:0Z6R+DF64Do2nwQic8a7kkfDLNNk4IiK+2U2Rci4htk, because the dropper only searches for the comment string before it appends. Also look for ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.apple.sysmond.plist and ~/.config/.smt.
Was the Microsoft Visual Studio Marketplace or npm affected?
Microsoft Threat Intelligence said the malicious packages were never published or distributed from the Visual Studio Marketplace or from npm @anthropic-ai/claude-code. Anthropic also told Microsoft it did not develop the Cursor listing. Users who only installed Claude Code from those two channels are outside the window Cursor defined.
Cursor rotated its marketplace keys and rebuilt the store after the October 29 window. It still has not said who held the publish rights that put Anthropic.claude-code 2.1.312 and 2.1.313 in front of those users.
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