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Sony’s PlayStation Store Win Rests on Discs It Will End

A London tribunal dismissed Sony’s £1.97bn PlayStation Store case, treating discs as a price leash even as new disc games end in January 2028.

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The Competition Appeal Tribunal on 17 November 2026 dismissed the claim in its entirety that Sony used the PlayStation Store as a near monopoly. The opt-out case, brought for about 12.2 million UK buyers, had sought about £1.971 billion ($2.6 billion).

Judges found Sony was not shown to be dominant in any relevant market. They treated boxed games as a live substitute for downloads, months after Sony dated the end of new discs.

A 12.2 Million-Player Claim Collapsed on Market Definition

Alex Neill Class Representative Limited sued Sony Interactive Entertainment Europe Limited and Sony Interactive Entertainment Network Europe Limited under section 18 of the Competition Act 1998 and, for the years before 31 December 2020, Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. The class covered UK digital purchases on PlayStation consoles from 19 August 2016 in England and Wales, and from 19 August 2017 in Scotland, through 12 February 2026.

The company, whose sole director is consumer advocate Alex Neill, said Sony shut out rival digital shops through exclusive dealing, tying, and a refusal to supply, then charged excessive and unfair prices on the PlayStation Store. Without that conduct, it argued, download prices would have been about 20% lower. It asked for about £1.490 billion in damages, plus simple interest of 8% a year, which produced the £1.971 billion total.

A panel of Ben Tidswell, the chair, Lord Richardson, and Derek Ridyard heard the case at Salisbury Square House in London. In the published judgment, [2026] CAT 86, they said the class representative “has failed to establish that Sony has infringed competition law,” and had put forward no fallback market if the digital-only one failed. That was enough to end the claim.

THE ROAD TO THE JUDGMENT

  1. 22 August 2022: The collective proceedings are filed.
  2. 21 November 2023: The tribunal certifies the opt-out class.
  3. 10 March 2026: A 30-day trial opens at Salisbury Square House.
  4. 8 May 2026: The hearing closes.
  5. 1 July 2026: Sony announces that new PlayStation games will leave discs after January 2028.
  6. 17 November 2026: The tribunal publishes [2026] CAT 86 and dismisses the claim.
  7. 7 December 2026: The deadline for permission-to-appeal papers is 4pm.

The Competition and Markets Authority filed written observations in 2025. Sony called 12 factual witnesses. The class representative called none. Stephanie Burns, senior vice president and general counsel at Sony Interactive Entertainment, said, “The ruling affirms Sony Interactive Entertainment’s business model.” Neill said the team was disappointed, that the case had been “five years in the making,” and that an appeal was under review.

Physical Games Were Treated as a Real Substitute

The fight was never really about whether Sony runs the checkout on its own store. It was about whether that store is a market on its own. The class drew a tight ring around digital PlayStation games and add-on content in the United Kingdom. The tribunal called that ring an unsafe basis for judging Sony’s conduct.

On the hypothetical monopolist test, the panel said physical copies were likely to be important substitutes, and that a small lasting rise in digital prices would push a material share of users toward discs. Sony’s own papers treated the two formats as close options: for most standard editions the product is the same game, delivered two ways. Buyers of discs can resell or lend them. Sony sets the PlayStation Store retail price after agreeing a wholesale price with publishers, and it targets a margin of about 30% of that retail price. On discs, publishers and third-party shops set the shelf price, and Sony plays no role. Expert evidence put the shop’s take at about 20-23% of the retail price, a different cut from Sony’s digital margin.

The class accepted a brutal fork. If discs and downloads were close substitutes, and so in the same market, the claim on digital game sales failed. Add-on content, which does not live on a disc in the same way, could have survived that fork. It did not, because the wider holding on dominance still fell over.

Judges also placed PlayStation in a systems market, where the console and the games bought for it compete as a package. They applied the European Union’s EFIM criteria and found buyers, especially heavy spenders who account for a large share of digital revenue, have enough information and enough reason to weigh game prices before they pick a machine. Sony’s own research, they said, forecast commercial harm if PlayStation game prices drifted away from Xbox. Even if Nintendo machines and gaming PCs sat outside the market, the judgment said it was very likely they still constrain both Sony and Microsoft, and that “there is abundant evidence that Sony sees both as a competitive threat.”

Sony Has Already Set a January 2028 Cutoff

That substitute is already on a clock Sony wound itself. In a 1 July 2026 post, Sid Shuman, senior director of content communications at Sony Interactive Entertainment, said physical disc production for all new games digital-only from January 2028 would stop, with shops still able to sell those titles as digital codes. Games already out, or due out on disc before that month, are untouched. Circana figures for the United States at the end of May 2026 found 27% of PlayStation 5 units and 52% of Xbox Series units were sold with no disc drive at all.

The 2028 plan landed after the trial. Paragraph 73 of the judgment records that physical games still made up a significant share of purchases during the claim period, and that the class representative then wrote to the tribunal about the July announcement. In a post-trial submission, the class said Sony’s ability to remove the disc channel at will proved the constraint was never real, and that discs and downloads were not in the same market.

The panel refused to rerun the case on a 2028 market. The claim period ends on 12 February 2026, and the cutoff sits well beyond it. Then it turned the class’s point around, in the passage that now sits under the win.

If there is no substitution between physical and digital games, then a decision to cease physical sales would mean that those sales would be lost altogether. If there is a legitimate concern with this decision, it would be (contrary to the Class Representative’s case) that it eliminates a competitive constraint on Sony from independent retailers and allows Sony to increase digital pricing once that constraint has gone.

Competition Appeal Tribunal, [2026] CAT 86

That is the awkward second life of this judgment. Independent disc shops can still undercut the Store, and Nintendo has sold some Switch 2 games $10 cheaper as downloads while keeping a physical footprint. From January 2028, a new PlayStation game sold in a shop is a Sony-priced code, not a disc whose shelf price Sony does not set. The physical games as a substitute finding is a holding about 2016 through early 2026. It is also a note the tribunal left on the file about what happens when that channel closes.

Why the Apple App Store Case Came Out Differently

The same tribunal had already found against Apple in Kent v Apple [2025] CAT 67, the iOS app distribution case decided in October 2025. The CMA’s January 2026 letter said it agreed with the legal approach taken there. Tidswell’s panel said it found those observations helpful, then reached the opposite result on PlayStation’s facts.

The distinction was practical. Putting a rival app store on an iPhone, the Sony judgment said, needed little adaptation of Apple’s platform. Opening PlayStation to a rival game shop would not. Sony told the tribunal it had “invested years and billions” in an integrated platform, and that the claim amounted to letting third parties “free-ride” on that spend. Nintendo and Xbox, it said, run similar models.

WHAT THE CLASS SAID, WHAT THE PANEL FOUND

Question Class case Tribunal finding
The market Digital PlayStation games and add-ons only A systems market, with discs and rival platforms in view
Dominance A near monopoly on the PlayStation Store Not shown in any relevant market
Download prices About 20% too high The 20% cut was not made out
Sony’s 30% digital margin Excessive and unfair Not shown to be excessive, and not shown to be unfair
Rival stores on the console Needed for real competition No duty to supply; the Bronner test was not met

The Apple contrast will travel. It does not mean a later PlayStation case wins by quoting 2028. It means this panel already wrote down why a closed games console is not an iPhone, including on the technical work a second store would take.

Third-Party Stores Failed the Bronner Test

Even on the class’s rejected digital market, the exclusion and pricing claims still failed. The counterfactual of a crowded PlayStation shop floor was, the panel said, “based almost entirely on theoretical assumptions, which did not hold good in important respects in the real world.” There was no real analysis that entry would have produced extra competition that could actually pay its way. The likely viable entrant, the judgment said, would have taken a bite of the retail margin not far from Sony’s own commission.

Refusal to supply was measured against Oscar Bronner, the European test for when a firm must open an essential facility. The class said that case law did not even apply, because the platform already hosts third-party games. The tribunal said Sony has not given up control of the Store so that anyone other than Sony can sell to users. Publishers sell games to Sony, which sells them on.

WHAT A RIVAL STORE WOULD HAVE REQUIRED

  • Platform work: A third party doing distribution would have needed a large rewrite of the platform and how it is run, at large cost and effort.
  • Security: Parts of the PlayStation Network would then have been likely to run with materially reduced security in the architecture.
  • Performance: The same rebuild carried a risk of reduced performance on the network.
  • Price effect: The panel saw no proof that a second store would have cut retail prices by the claimed 20%, and thought the viable fee stack would have looked a lot like Sony’s.

On unfair pricing, the class had to show the margin was excessive and then that it was unfair. It showed neither. Sony sells consoles at low or negative profit and recoups the spend on games, add-ons, and services. The tribunal would not treat that cross-subsidy as a free pass if the market had been digital-only, because the recovery would then have sat in a different market from the alleged abuse. That mismatch, it said, is why a systems market was the cleaner description of how this business actually works. The tying claim died with that choice of market.

The Same Theory Is Still Live Outside Britain

The UK result does not close the docket. Similar class actions remain at an earlier stage in Australia, the Netherlands, and Portugal. Permission to appeal this judgment is a separate step. The tribunal has listed a further hearing in the week beginning 14 December 2026 on costs and any application for permission, after the 4pm deadline on 7 December 2026.

A later case will not be able to pretend the disc channel still looks like 2019. It also will not be able to ignore the holdings that did not depend on discs: the systems-market analysis, the failed 20% price story, the Bronner result, and the finding that a 30% digital margin was not shown to be excessive or unfair. Those points are why a 2028 cutoff does not, on this text, flip the outcome by itself.

The popular objection is still the one the judgment already flagged. Once new discs go, independent shops lose the product whose price Sony does not set, and the Store’s remaining retail rivals are selling Sony’s own digital codes. The tribunal used physical games to knock out a £1.971 billion claim for the years through February 2026. It also wrote, in plain words, what it thought that constraint is worth after Sony takes the discs away.

Disclaimer: This article is news reporting on a published first-instance judgment of the Competition Appeal Tribunal and is for information only. It is not legal advice, is not a view on the merits of any appeal, and is not a recommendation to join, leave, or rely on any collective claim in the United Kingdom or elsewhere. Readers with a live claim, a limitation deadline, or a question about their own purchases should take advice from a qualified solicitor or other authorised lawyer in the relevant country before acting. Figures, class dates, and case status are those in the sources at 17 November 2026 and can change if an appeal is sought or if Sony’s disc plans are altered.

Harry is the editor and lead writer of STUDIO ONE NETWORKS, an independent title he owns and runs himself. Ten years in journalism, reporting first and editing later, taught him that entertainment and business are one beat seen from two sides: a box office figure is a company number, a streaming deal is a contract, a casting rumour is not a story until someone puts their name to it. He works from the record, whether that is a distributor's statement, a licensing agreement, an interview transcript or a set of published ratings, and checks every number against it before publication. The same rule holds for the rest of the site, which covers news, technology, science, sports, lifestyle, travel, auto and gaming for an audience spread across the world. When he gets something wrong, the article is corrected and the change is noted and dated, under a corrections policy anyone can read. Reader mail is answered by him at support@studioonenetworks.com.

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